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Abstract—A DVB-RCS based, hierarchical satellite network
model is presented. The network is constituted by two levels
for the allocation of the resources, i.e. beam level and terminal
level. For each level will be studied two differents approaches, in
particular the second level resource allocation has been developed
according two different game theoretical approaches, based on
both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory.
Index Terms—satellite communications, DVB-RCS, resource
allocation, Game Theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
The new generation satellite standards, DVB-S2, [1], and
DVB-RCS, [2], are meant to deliver multimedia contents over
time-varying channels in the Ka frequency band or above. In
this portion of the frequency spectrum, the communication are
particularly sensitive to atmosperical events such as rain and
clouds. It has been verified for these standards, [3], that in case
of hostile atmospherical events, interactive TCP based elastic
connections show a fast decrease of data throughput leading
to an out-of-service period for the whole duration of the event.
Our idea to deal with this issue, it is to perform a distributed
resource allocation between satellite terminals using a game
theoretical approach. Game theory is a mathematical tool that
allows to model interactions between subjects with conflicting
objectives. Game theory has already been adopted for the rate
control of information sources in high-speed networks, [4].
It has been applied also in wireless networks to perform a
distributed medium access control, [5]. The reasons beacuse
game theory is appropriate for communications contests is due
both to its distributed nature and to its high scalability, as it
has been argumented in [6].
In the next section the system architecture will be in-
troduced. In section III the first level resource allocation
methods will be described. The game theory approaches for
the second level of the hierarchical system are presented in
detail in section IV. In section V we examine the results of
the simulations and we compare, for each level, the methods
considered. Finally our conclusions will be discussed.
II. THE SATELLITE RESOURCE HIERARCHY
We consider as reference architecture a DVB-RCS hierar-
chical satellite network, constituted by two levels as shown
in figure 1. In the first level the global resource to access the
uplink channel is assigned to beams constituting the footprint
of the satellite on the ground. A beam achieves a part of the
resource accordingly an algorithm will be specified in section
III. In the second level of the hierarchy, the resource formerly
assigned to a beam is shared between the satellite stations
located in that beam. These satellite stations can be thought
both as independent terminals or as gateway providing Internet
access to terminals in a subnet. These stations compete for the
shared resource using a game theoretical approach that will be
presented in section IV. The resource, that is shared in both
levels of the system, is the bandwidth.
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Figure 1. The system architecture.
This two level reference architecture has been considered to
make the resource access more flexible and scalable according
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the traffic and the atmospherical conditions of the various
beams.
III. THE FIRST ALLOCATION LEVEL
In the first level of the system architecture, the bandwidth,
available on the satellite to access the return channel, is
allocated to the beams. The bandwidth allocation is aimed
to optimize the aggregate rate of the system:
max
N∑
i=1
fα(Ri) (1)
where Ri can be expressed as:
Ri = ηBiBi (2)
In the former equations N is the number of beams defined
by the satellite, Ri is the rate achieved by the i-th beam with
an amount of bandwidth Bi, while ηBi is the beam spectral
efficiency and it is obtained averaging the spectral efficiency
of the satellite terminals located within the borders of the i-
th beam. The ηBi coefficient keeps intrinsically into account
the average communication channel conditions of each beam,
i.e. those beams which are mostly affected by rain events
show lower values of ηBi since the satellite terminals into
their borders have low values of the spectral efficiency, due to
the stronger channel coding. The fα(·) : R→ R is a generic
utility function introduced by Mo and Walrand in [7] and here
reported:
fα(x) =


x1−α
1−α , if α  0, α = 1
lnx, if α = 1
(3)
The function fα depends on the fairness parameter α which
establishes the degree of fairness used to share the resource.
The optimization in (1) is computed in a centralized way,
i.e. by the NCC or by a dedicated on-board subsystem. Two
possible allocation methods will be studied: a first that is
fair, and a second one that is more opportunistic. In the fair
method the value of α is 1 and this corresponds to the concept
of proportional fairness presented in [8]. In the opportunistic
case instead α = 0 that means no fairness; this value of the
fairness parameter, in constrained optimization problems, is
equivalent to global optimization. To both the formulations of
the optimization problem have been added some constraints:
N∑
i=1
Bi  Bsat, (4)
Bi  Bmini , i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (5)
Bi  Bmaxi , i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (6)
The former constraints are considering the satellite available
bandwidth, Bsat, limitation, the minimum amount of band,
Bmini , necessary to the beam i-th, and finally the maximum
value, Bmaxi , the i-th beam can achieve.
The formulation adopted involves, when opportunistic allo-
cation is applied, the satellite bandwidth is assigned firstly to
those beams that shows the higher values of ηBi ; instead when
fair allocation is performed, the higher ηBi coefficients weight
is made milder by logarithmic utility functions, so those beams
affected temporarily by rain events get more bandwidth than
in the opportunistic case.
IV. THE SECOND ALLOCATION LEVEL
In the second level of the hierarchy the satellite terminals lo-
cated in a beam compete for the bandwidth formerly assigned
in the first level. The competition between terminals for the
resource is modeled using the game theory. In such competi-
tion the aim of each terminal is to achieve as much bandwidth
as possible in order to transmit on the return channel at the
highest possible throughput. The satellite terminal throughput,
Tst, has been related with the occupied bandwidth, B, through
the following relation:
Tst = pibrc
2
1 + ρ
[1− Pe(γr)]L B (7)
where pib is the percentage of information bits on the total in
the traffic burst containing one ATM cell, rc is the channel
coding rate in use, ρ is the roll-off factor, Pe is the bit error
probability function of the signal-to-noise ratio γr and L is
the number of bits of a single traffic burst.
Two different game theoretical frameworks have been de-
veloped: the first is based on the non-cooperative game
approach, while the second one has been formulated using
the cooperative game approach. The structure of the game
has been defined for both the cases and it is basically the
same: the satellite terminals are the players of the game,
the strategies are constituted by the different amounts of
bandwidth a terminal can choose to occupy. As far as it
concerns about the utility functions, for the non-cooperative
framework logarithmic functions of the throughput have been
used, while for the cooperative case linear utility functions
have been defined.
The two alternatives will be compared in order to establish
which one is more performing in case of heavy channel
attenuations due to rain events.
A. Non-cooperative Framework
The non-cooperative framework adopts the n-person con-
cave game model theorized by Rosen in [9]. The n-person con-
cave game model has the property, under specific conditions,
to have a Nash Equilibrium Point that is unique as well. At
Nash Equilibrium the players adopt the best possible answer
according the other players strategies, i.e. no one achieves gain
deviating from the equilibrium point. Considering our study
case, the Nash Equilibrium Point, B∗, is formally defined in
the following way:
ϕj(B∗j ,B
∗
−j)  ϕj(Bj ,B∗−j), ∀Bj ∈ Sj (8)
where ϕj(·) is the utility function for the j-th user, B∗j is the
best bandwidth occupation strategy for the user j-th, B∗−j is
the vector of other players best answer strategies and Sj is the
strategies feasible set for the j-th player. The set S, product of
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the each player sets Sj , is a convex and compact subspace of
RM , where M is the number of players. This fact is essential
to grant the existence of a Nash Equilibrium. Such equilibrium
point is also unique since the utility functions used are strictly
concave.
The Nash Equilibrium has been found using a gradient
projection algorithm, as suggested in [9]:
Bk+1 = Bk + αk (B¯k −Bk) (9)
with B¯k so defined:
B¯k =
[
Bk + τkg(Bk)
]+ (10)
In the former ones, B ∈ S is the vector containing the
bandwidth allocations for each satellite station, αk ∈ [0, 1] is a
scalar coefficient that force the bandwidth allocation vector to
stay in the feasible set S, τk is the algorithm stepsize, g(Bk)
is the pseudogradient of B and the operator [ · ]+ does the
projection of its argument on the set S.
Each terminal computes the vector B∗ solution of the game in
a distributed way, on the basis of common information shared
by the terminals of a beam. The common knowledge between
satellite terminals is mandatory to make the equilibrium point
reachable.
B. Cooperative Framework
The second level cooperative framework is based on the
cooperative games concepts introduced by Nash in [10]. In
a cooperative game the players don’t have purposes neither
totally coincident nor totally opposed. However it’s supposed
a forcing agreement can be reached by the players of the game
through a reciprocal information exchange. Assuming also the
players cannot group into coalitions, the cooperative problem
can be analyzed as an n-persons bargaining problem similar
to the one theorized in [11]. For these kind of problems, the
solution is achieved maximizing the productory of the utility
funtions. In the cooperative framework the utility functions
have been considered linear respect to the throughput, so the
problem becomes:
max
M∏
j=1
[(Tstj − Tst−minj ) + 1] (11)
where M is the number of players involved in the game,
Tstj the throughput for the j-th player and Tst−minj is
the minimum throughput requested, and granted, to the j-th
terminal. For this kind of problem the solution is the Nash
Bargaining Point, NBP. Such point has the property to be
Pareto optimal, i.e. the bandwidth strategies maximizing (11)
achieve the best possible results for the players, unlike the
Nash Equilibrium Point that generally isn’t Pareto efficient.
This is the actual difference between the two solution points.
The (11) can be transformed into:
max
M∑
j=1
ln[(Tstj − Tst−minj ) + 1] (12)
which is equivalent to the original problem since the feasibility
set is convex and compact, and the utility functions are injec-
tive and strictly concave. The problem (12) has been solved
using convex programming methods as Lagrange multipliers
method.
V. COMPUTER SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
The whole system has been implemented in Matlab
environment and simulations have been performed in order
to analyze and compare the allocation methods of the two
levels hierarchy. The DVB-RCS specifications, [2] and [12],
have been considered to define the satellite network physical
layer and the traffic burst format. Table I contains the other
parameters used in the simulations.
Table I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Uplink transmission power 0 dBW
Antenna gain 45 dB
Distance satellite-terminal 38000 km
Uplink frequency 29.7 GHz
Pointing loss attenuation 1 dB
G/T factor of satellite receiver 13 dB/K
A single traffic class has been assumed while the traffic packets
incoming in the terminals queues have been modeled with a
Poisson distribution. The attenuation term due to rain has been
modeled using a lognormal distribution.
The first level allocation methods have been compared in
terms of the average rate of the beams. The comparisons have
been done varying different parameters as the satellite avail-
able bandwidth, the system beams number, the percentage of
beams experimenting rain. In figure 2 the beam average rate is
plotted as function of the satellite available uplink bandwidth.
It’s evident the increasing difference there is between the two
methods for high amounts of bandwidth, instead, when the
band is lacking, both the opportunistic and fair method achieve
the same performances. The average rate as function of the
beams number it is shown in figure 3. The trend of both the
curves is decreasing in a polynomial way with the number
of beams growing. As in the former graph, also in this one
it’s evident the opportunistic allocation curve it’s above the
fair allocation curve till the number of beams is under the
value of 35. The two methods are equivalent in terms of rate
when the number of beams exceeds the value of 35. In figure
4 is graphed the rate as function of the percentage of beams
affected by rain. In this graph when rain events affects more
than the 35 % of system beams, the fair allocation line crosses
the opportunistic one. This fact implies the fair method is
better in such situations.
The two game theoretical frameworks used in the second
level will be now considered. Unlike the first level, the average
throughput of satellite terminals will be examined in the
second level. The variables in this case are the number of
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Figure 2. Average rate as function of the satellite uplink bandwidth.
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Figure 3. Average rate as function of the system number of beams.
terminals in a beam and the percentage of terminals experi-
menting attenuation due to rain. In figure 5 e 6 are shown the
trends of average throughput in two different kinds of beam: a
first affected by rain attenuation and a second one which isn’t.
With “beam affected by rain attenuation” is meant a beam
in which all terminals experiment this kind of attenuation.
For the case of attenuated beam, figure 5, the comparison
between the frameworks reveals that the cooperative based
allocation achieves better throughput performance. The co-
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Figure 4. Average rate as function of beams percentage affected by rain.
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Figure 5. Average throughput as function of the number of terminals in the
beam.
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
 Beam  not subject to rain attenuation
Num ber of satellite term inals within the beam
S
at
e
lli
te
 T
er
m
in
a
ls
 A
ve
ra
ge
 T
hr
o
u
gh
pu
t [k
bp
s] Non-Cooperative Fram ework
   Cooperative fram ework
Figure 6. Average throughput as function of the number of terminals in the
beam.
operative framework has a drawback, it cannot be used in
contests where the number of terminals is greather than 200,
that is coeherent with the formulation adopted. Differently
the non-cooperative framework is always valid, due to the
actual competitions occurring between terminals. In the case
of the beams not subject to rain attenuation, figure 6, both the
frameworks achieve identical performances as it is shown by
the two overlapping lines. In the graph it is also evident the
limitation of the cooperative framework as in the former case.
The graph in figure 6 shows a comparison between the two
frameworks. The percentage of terminals experimenting rain
events has been considered as varying parameter. Two aspects
can be identified: the cooperative framework achieve always
better throughput values than the non-cooperative allocation.
Moreover it’s evident the difference between the approaches
increases costantly when the percentage value tends to 90%.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A two level hierarchical system architecture based on DVB-
RCS has been developed. The first level adopted two different
allocation methods: opportunistic and fair. These methods have
been compared through simulations with Matlab. It has been
found that, in normal conditions, the opportunistic allocation
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Figure 7. Average throughput as function of the percentage of terminals
affected by rain.
achieves better results in terms of beam average rate. In
presence of rain events affecting a certain percentage of beams,
with fair allocation it’s reached an higher average rate respect
to the opportunistic case.
As far as it concerns the second level resource allocation
the simulations have shown that the non-cooperative and
cooperative game theory based allocations produce identical
results in normal conditions. Instead for the case of a beam
experimenting rain attenuation the cooperative framework has
been found to achieve higher throughput values than the non-
cooperative one. A limitation due to the formulation emerged
in the cooperative framework. Such limitation suggests co-
operative framework could be suitable to manage the second
level available bandwidth for privileged traffic connections, as
high priority elastic connections, in both situations.
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